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DYLAN TRIGG
THE ROLE OF THE EARTH IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY1
Introduction 
This paper aims to chart the importance of the concept Earth in Merleau-
Ponty’s late philosophy, specifi cally as it fi gures in a series of commentaries 
on a late fragment of Husserl’s widely known as “The Earth Does Not Move” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). As I argue in this paper, the fragment is essential not 
only for scholars of Husserl, but also for an understanding of the development 
of Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking, especially as it is played out in the lecture 
notes on nature as well as his unfi nished manuscript, The Visible and the 
Invisible (Merleau-Ponty 2003/1968). As we will see, it is striking if not 
uncanny how the Earth fragment continues to haunt Merleau-Ponty during the 
late years of his life, and with each re-reading, the axis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy seems to turn increasingly away from the horizon of experience to 
what will become an “archaeological phenomenology.”2 
Written in 1934, Husserl’s fragment is a preliminary study of the relation 
of the Earth as the ground of being. His Earth, as we will see, is that which 
renders movement, rest, and thus the structure of the body possible in the fi rst 
instance in both its kinaesthetic relation with the world and in its intercorporeal 
relation with others. Against the “modern” (Copernican) tendency to reduce 
the Earth to a planet among many, for Husserl, the Earth as it is pregiven to 
experience is no less than the ground of all possibilities. 
Merleau-Ponty’s “commentary” on the Earth fragment in his lecture notes 
is as much a dialogue with the dead Husserl as it is a development of his 
own thinking at the time.3 For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s fragment becomes 
an opportunity to articulate a series of concepts he was working on at the time 
of his Collége de France lectures on nature (1957) through to his lectures on 
Husserl at the same institution (1959-60), and then up to his fi nal incomplete 
manuscript, The Visible and the Invisible (1960-1961), published three years 
after his premature death in 1961. Throughout this trajectory in his career, 
Merleau-Ponty’s continuous dialogue with Husserl is aimed at grounding 
Merleau-Ponty’s own radical ontology, an ontology that seeks to incorporate 
Husserl while also recognising that only through betraying Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism is a genuine ontology possible.
It is, perhaps, no coincidence, therefore, that faced with the Husserlian 
fragment on the Earth as an arc—or better arche (origin)—, Merleau-
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Ponty will term his method of eliciting the unthought element in Husserl an 
“archaeology” (2002). By phrasing his late phenomenology as archaeological, 
Merleau-Ponty not only accents the importance of origins but also points to 
the ground in which those origins are buried while at the same time remaining 
constitutive of the ground itself. Thus, if Merleau-Ponty is able to pronounce 
his phenomenology as a “phenomenology of origins” in the Phenomenology 
of Perception, then it is only in his late thinking that his thought gains the 
archaeological foundations able to support this claim (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
xxxii). 
In order to assess the role of this fragment within Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking, three stages are mapped out. First, I offer a preliminary exposition 
of the fragment itself, focusing in particular on the role of the body in its co-
constitution with the Earth. From this account, a series of questions opens up 
that are left unresolved in Husserl, not least the question of whether the Earth 
as playing a constitutive structure in the body can be understood in terms of 
transcendental phenomenology alone. 
Accordingly, in the second part of the paper, I turn to both Merleau-Ponty’s 
lectures on nature and also his specifi c lectures on Husserl as they are collected 
under the title Husserl and the Limits of Phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty 
2003/2002). Each of these lectures presents us with a different treatment of 
Husserl, and the difference becomes vital in Merleau-Ponty’s own ontology. For 
what is at stake in the late reading of Husserl is the departure from Husserlian 
phenomenology to what will become Merleau-Ponty’s “archaeological 
phenomenology,” a term I will explicate in time. 
Thus, in the fi nal part of the paper, I sketch out how this archaeological 
thinking is rooted in the Earth fragment, without a consideration of which, 
any understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking would remain incomplete. 
My argument can be formulated as follows: Merleau-Ponty’s account of the 
Earth is Husserlian insofar as it reinforces the primordial “ground (sol) of 
experience” but at the same time marks a departure from Husserl insofar as the 
Earth registers a brute or wild layer that resists phenomenology (cf. Merleau-
Ponty 1964b, 1968). This notion of a brute and wild being (l’être sauvage), 
which Merleau-Ponty owes in part to the infl uence of Schelling,4 refers to an 
elemental Being, which is not only anonymous but also anterior to the subject 
and in this respect, fulfi ls an archaeological phenomenology. 
Husserl’s Earth 
Before we turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, let us begin at the origin: 
Husserl. Husserl begins his fragment by stating the importance of the topic, 
going so far as to preface his notes with the claim that the “following pages 
are…foundational for a phenomenological doctrine of the origin of spatiality, 
corporeality, Nature in the sense of the natural sciences, and therefore for a 
transcendental theory of natural scientifi c knowledge” (117). Even if the 
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fragment is a preparatory study, then the inclusion of spatiality, corporeality, 
and the scientifi c knowledge of Nature are tied together in his specifi cally 
phenomenological account of the Earth. The account is specifi cally 
phenomenological, as Husserl positions himself in contrast to a naturalistic and 
“modern” account of consciousness, whose concern is particular objects in the 
world rather than the very ground(ing) of those objects. Foundational, in this 
context, therefore, refers not only to the foundational of a phenomenological 
enquiry but also to the foundation or ground (Boden) of experience itself.5 
His point of departure for establishing this foundation is to begin with the 
surrounding world as an infi nite space; that is, a space that “is not completely 
conceived, represented, but that is already implicitly formed” (117). This 
occurs on a localised level in terms of the borders between city and countryside, 
between individual countries, between continents, and then of the Earth itself. 
On this initial phenomenological reduction, the Earth is given as a unity taken 
from the standpoint of the individual subject, who unifi es “the experiential 
fi eld…in a continuous and combined experience” (118).
From a “modern” (Copernican) perspective, the Earth is a discrete star 
set against the backdrop of “infi nite space” (118). More than this, it is a 
body, though a special kind of body. Not one that can be approached in its 
wholeness—Husserl is writing, of course, before the famous Blue Marble photo 
taken in 1972 by the crew of Apollo 17—but a body that is the “experiential 
ground of all bodies” (118). Our everyday relationship to the Earth, as Husserl 
presents it, is not a bifurcated relationship, whereby the Earth is simply one 
star among many. Nor is it a fragment of materiality on which other smaller 
fragments exist. Rather, the Earth is a ground (Erdboden) and in this respect, a 
constitutive structure in our experience of spatiality. 
To this end, the Earth, considered as originary phenomena, “does not move 
and does not rest” (118). It is only in a relational way that movement and rest 
come to have an ontic signifi cance. Phenomenologically, therefore, Husserl is 
obliged to place the Copernican perspective of the Earth, as a thing located into 
cosmic space, secondary. If the Earth does not move, then movement becomes 
a relation—a “certain relativity”—which is tied up with my “corporeal fl esh” 
(121). All of which is possible thanks to the fact the Earth is experienced, not 
as a localised body—at least not a body that can be understood in terms of 
other bodies—but as a ground of bodies. Put another way, if the Earth is not in 
movement, then this is only because it is the very ground for the possibility of 
movement, and thus for experience. 
Seen in this way, Husserl’s Earth is, before anything else, a given of 
experience. Considered in this pre-thematic way, the Earth assumes its 
importance as a spatial origin of the very structure and possibility of bodily 
existence, without which movement and rest would not be possible. The task, 
such as it is phenomenologically, is to return to the Earth itself—the Earth that 
underpins all subsequent scientifi c reductions of the same planet to a material 
entity and in this respect, to reinforce its validity as a relation. 
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With this background, Husserl is now in a position to consider the relationship 
between the Earth as a singular planet and the human bodies that inhabit that 
world. Central to this preliminary phenomenology of the Earth is the question 
of whether or not there can be another Earth. As we have seen, without the 
Earth as a foundation, the formation of the body would be impossible. Against 
this claim, the question of another Earth comes up in two ways. First, if the 
Earth can be conceived as a body, then it is only in relation to another Earth. 
Without this other Earth, the original Earth retains its validity as an originary 
foundation but resists being phenomenologically conceived as a body in its 
own right.
Second, the more pressing question to the existence of another Earth is the 
human body’s relation to the Earth we already know. Such a question draws to 
the light the singularity animating the role of the Earth as being constitutive of 
our experience of bodily space. Can another Earth assume the constitutive role 
the present Earth does now, and if so what are the implications for corporeality 
as we know it?
For the present purposes, we shall give attention to the second question.6 
The question of whether “outer bodies” can, as it were, leave the Earth behind, 
is approached via the “same earth” that is shared between bodies. This common 
foundation unites my body with yours, coupling us not only as intercorporeal 
subjects but also as inter-earthly subjects, too. It is at this juncture that Husserl 
embarks on a compelling thought experiment. He asks us to imagine a bird that 
can fl y beyond the Earth, there in this “carnal fl ight-vessel” and now able to 
see the Earth as a “large spherical body” (125). Throughout this voyage, even 
on a “fl ying machine” able to “experience” stars, the body—be it human or 
bird—remains tied to the Earth, from where it receives its bearings and origins. 
As primordially constituted by the Earth, our sense of being endowed with 
earthly bodies in an earthly space is beyond transcendence. The Earth, in its 
geological and temporal depth, marks the existence of my fl esh, constitutes the 
body in such a way that whatever secrets the Earth conceals are also concealed 
within myself. As Husserl has it, our own history as belonging to a particular 
homeland, is overarched by the homeworld of the Earth, to which we each 
belong and can never escape without already defi ning ourselves as having 
left the Earth, as he writes: “All developments, all relative histories have to 
that extent a single primordial history of which they are episodes” (127). This 
distinction between a macrocosmic and a microcosmic history ties over into 
the body, which presents itself as having two orders of time: that of the lived 
and personal and that of the impersonal and earthly, the latter being beyond 
experience and thus marking a prehistoric order. 
In the speculation of another Earth, therefore, Husserl’s account of the 
history of the body ties us with an origin that is beyond the subject. Of other 
planets, Husserl is prepared to suggest that the “interpretation of the world 
in human history, in the history of the species, within the evolution of the 
individual and people, [is] an obviously accidental event on the earth which 
might just as well have occurred on Venus or Mars” (129-130). In turn, 
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other planets would simply assume the constitutive role that the Earth does 
presently. 
Likewise, if I am an astronaut who decides to settle on Mars as my “primordial 
home,” then at no point does my colonization and subsequent approbation of 
Mars as my homeland strip me of my “terrestrial humanity” (13). As he writes 
decisively: “There is only one humanity and one earth—all the fragments which 
are or have been separated from it belong to it” (130). Husserl’s Earth, such as 
it is, is fundamentally sculpted by its human constitution, just as humanity is 
fundamentally sculpted by its earthliness. This does not discount the “modern” 
view of the Earth as a body, but instead presents us with two sides of the same 
face: a transcendental Earth and an objective Earth. 
Toward the end of the fragment, Husserl makes a curious intervention in 
this line of thought, as though in passing. Developing a series of objections 
against the primordiality of the Earth—the possibility of another Earth and 
the fragmentation of the Earth being two possible objections—he then adds 
another one from the perspective of science, namely “that entropy will put an 
end to all life on earth, or that celestial bodies will crash into the earth, etc.” 
(131). The thought being that the phenomenological validity of the Earth as 
ground would lose its legitimacy when reduced to the status of a thing. We will 
return to this passage below, as it merits an incisive comment from Merleau-
Ponty and also assumes a special place in our own treatment of Merleau-Ponty. 
To summarise our fi ndings so far, Husserl presents us with an account of 
the Earth as a foundation. It is a foundation in at least two respects. In the fi rst 
respect, the Earth is a foundation in that it renders movement and rest possible 
by establishing a relational axis between the body and the Earth as ground. In 
the second respect, it is a foundation in that it constitutes the specifi city of the 
body as having an origin. So long as there are human bodies, then those bodies 
will remain tied to the Earth, which can never truly be left behind, even given 
the prospect of terraforming another Earth other than our own. 
A series of questions opens up in light of these claims. Is the Earth primarily 
given as a unitary foundation for corporeal existence or does Husserl underplay 
the structure of the Earth as a discrete body? For that matter, what are we to 
make of Husserl’s remarks on the origin of the body as being transcendentally 
constituted by the Earth? Can we conceive of the body aside from the Earth? 
And likewise, can we conceive of the Earth without the body?7
It is to these more enigmatic questions that we can now turn to Merleau-
Ponty. As mentioned above, there are two specifi c pieces of writing from the 
late Merleau-Ponty that will allow us to map together not only his response 
to Husserl but also his modifi cation of Husserl’s account of the Earth. 
Accordingly, in the following section, we will turn to Merleau-Ponty’s lecture 
notes on Husserl as they fi gure in both the lectures on nature from 1956-1957 
and the subsequent notes from his course on Husserl from 1960. We will then 
end by sketching the invisible lines of thought in this assemblage of fragments 
and notes. 
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Originary Objects
Merleau-Ponty’s course from the Collège de France lectures on nature 
contains a rich pool of thought that traces the theme of Nature from the Stoics 
to quantum theory and then onto Merleau-Ponty’s own ontology, which will 
fold into his account of the fl esh. The collected notes are divided into three 
parts. The fi rst two courses are on the “concept of nature” and “modern science 
and nature,” each course not written by Merleau-Ponty himself but assembled 
together by an unknown auditor or student. Only the third course on the human 
body is written by Merleau-Ponty, and, as mentioned above, even there the 
notes are written for himself and thus at times highly inscrutable. 
Of concern to us presently is his discussion of Husserl in the fi rst part of 
the book. Merleau-Ponty’s initial discussion of the late fragment comes via a 
discussion of the body as positioned in space (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 74). This 
discussion is consistent with the account of the body as it fi gures in both the 
earlier Husserl and the earlier Merleau-Ponty. Here, Merleau-Ponty outlines 
how the lived body coincides with the things in which the body lives, meaning 
that there is a “carnal unity” that accompanies my experience of the world 
(74). This unity in turn leads to Husserl’s discussion of one hand touching 
another, which Merleau-Ponty famously employs in The Visible and Invisible. 
It is thanks to the fact that the body is an “absolute here”—a phrase that stems 
from the earlier Phenomenology of Perception—that this interchange between 
the body as a subjective organ of perception and the body as an objective organ 
perceived becomes possible. Around the body, the surrounding world remains 
relative to the irreducibility of my corporeal life, a life that not only includes 
my relation to my own body but also to others (75). The other enters the scene 
of my corporeal life not as an analogy of my existence, but as an extension 
of corporeality, of which both self and other partake in what Merleau-Ponty 
would term an “interworld” (76). 
All of which is a prefatory context for the ensuing discussion of the Earth, 
which marks a distinction between Husserl’s early and late thinking. As 
Merleau-Ponty notes, added to this division between self and other in their joint 
corporeality is the gradual subjectifi cation of “quasi-objects” in Husserl (77). 
Such “quasi-objects” would include the Earth. Here, Merleau-Ponty follows 
Husserl’s line of thought closely, regarding the Earth as “the living stock from 
which the objects are engendered” (77). Moreover, because it serves to contain 
all the possibilities of objects, it establishes itself as a “cradle” for those things 
(77). 
Yet in “situating the Earth among the planets,” this primordial ground has 
been forgotten. Or, at least, apparently forgotten. After all, what Husserl shows 
us is that the Earth as a ground can never be forgotten so long as we remain 
bodily subjects, as Merleau-Ponty remarks after Husserl: “To think two Earths 
is to think one same Earth” (77). In this respect, in both Merleau-Ponty and 
Husserl, the Earth is not doubled but instead expanded as an all-encompassing 
“carrier of all the possible,” which is beyond transcendence (77).
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We now come to a critical problem, both for Husserl and for Merleau-
Ponty. The problem is one that we left hanging in our earlier engagement with 
Husserl, namely: what becomes of the Earth when humans cease to exist and 
thus references also cease to be? The problem is important because it pushes 
to the surface the very limit the extent to which the Earth and the body are 
co-constituted. Not only this, but it also thematizes the question of how the 
Earth—if we take the Earth as not only as an Urheimat (primal home) but also 
an Urhistorie (primal history)—can be considered as both phenomenological 
and non-phenomenological in structure. 
We already know that Husserl formulates the Earth as an original ground, 
which is beyond transcendence. In the face of a destroyed Earth devoid of its 
humanity, Husserl only reinstates the validity of transcendental phenomenology 
by drawing an analogy between a fragmented Earth and the process of dying. 
In the case of the death of others, a unity is retained insofar as “recollection 
permeates life—I still live,” and thanks to the power of reiteration I am able to 
retain the presence of the “We” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 131). With this, Husserl 
is setting up his counter-response to the notion of an Earth that is in the fi rst 
instance a mass of material reality, and that alone. 
Husserl here turns to a transcendental argument for the existence of 
the “constituted world,” asking directly “What sense could the collapsing 
masses in space…have, if the constituting life were eliminated” (131). It 
is the constituting ego as a transcendental entity that “precedes all actual 
and possible beings, and anything existent whether in a real or irreal sense” 
(131). For this reason, any such reference to the fi nitude of the Earth’s 
collapse hinges at all times on a prior positing of the transcendental structure 
of the constituting ego, stating that “What belongs to constitution is, and 
is alone, the absolute and ultimate necessity” (131). And this prehistorical, 
prepersonal origin takes root in the body, which is prior to scientifi c inquiry 
and therefore cannot be augmented even in experiential terms, as Husserl 
has it of the experiential quality of time: “The constituted time of the world, 
more particularly, conceals itself in itself psychological time, and the 
psychological refers back to the transcendental” (131). In other words, the 
experiential level of existence, in which the body is bearer of time, hinges at 
all times on a loop folding back upon the transcendental possibility of time. 
Such a time operates at another level from that of our own existence; that of 
a constituting level. 
It is important to note here that Husserl’s usage of “constitution,” especially 
as it fi gures in the period of The Crisis of European Sciences, refers to the way in 
which particular things are given their meaning and sense (Husserl 1970). If the 
world itself is not reducible to the constitution—given this would entail a form 
of idealism—then this does not mean that consciousness can step outside of the 
correlation with the world. Rather the world as the sensible world of meaning 
and understanding is such only that it can be understood with respect to the 
constituting ego. Meaning appears here, therefore, not as something fabricated 
by consciousness, but something that is revealed in relation to consciousness. 
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Given the role of constitution for Husserl, the world is always already there 
for us, since without the world there is no body and no body without the world. 
It is on this point that Merleau-Ponty appears—at least, initially—to agree with 
Husserl, writing of this passage that: “We have to admit then that the world 
is not an appearance in relation to the appearances of pure things, but on the 
contrary that it is founding in relation to these pure things” (Merleau-Ponty 
2003, 78). 
In turn, this leads Merleau-Ponty to present Husserl’s philosophy of nature 
as one of retaining a fi delity to originary phenomenon, of which the subject 
him or herself “continues” but does not “initiate” (78). In this way, Nature 
emerges, not as the Urheimat itself, but instead as meeting of body and Earth, 
and thus of “interiority” and “exteriority,” which all subjects partake of in a 
primordial way (78). This “common primal presence,” so Husserl remarks in 
a passage from Ideas II cited by Merleau-Ponty, “…is nature in the fi rst and 
original sense” (78).
 
***
Husserl’s account of the constituting ego is problematic on several grounds. 
Above all, though, it is unclear how Husserl is able to account for the “original 
sense” of Earth so long as he remains tied to the idealization of the constituting 
ego. Indeed, the paradoxical quality of the Earth without bodily subjects only 
remains paradoxical so long as Husserl commits himself to the primacy of the 
ego as assuming a constituting role. To be sure, as Merleau-Ponty indicates, the 
term “constitution” assumes a multiplicity of meanings in Husserl: “The word 
‘constitution’ undoubtedly has a very large meaning in Husserl, who always 
distinguished a constitution by acts from a ‘latent’ constitution” (79). Yet it 
is precisely this latter constitution or intentionality that remains beneath and 
prior to the constituting ego, which is both underplayed and underdeveloped 
in the late Husserl, albeit even if Husserl presents this series of thoughts in a 
“preparatory” way (79). 
At the Limits of Phenomenology
The suggestion here of the need for another phenomenology—what he will 
proceed to describe in psychoanalytical terms as a “phenomenology which 
descends into its own substratum”—is where Merleau-Ponty seems to leave us 
at the end of his notes on Husserl and nature (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 70). It is 
at this very intersection between a latent intentionality and a constituting ego 
that Merleau-Ponty will depart from Husserl. As we turn from the lectures note 
on nature to the later lectures on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty will stage a series 
of subtle shifts in his reading of the “The Earth Does Note Move” fragment. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s course notes collected in Husserl at the Limits of 
Phenomenology present us with not simply with a commentary on Husserl but 
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an expansion of Merleau-Ponty’s own philosophy, which dovetails with his 
thinking in the unfi nished The Visible and the Invisible. 
As with the course notes on nature, Merleau-Ponty begins by following 
Husserl in maintaining a view of the Earth as that which “engulfs” the corporeal 
subject, establishing a “unity of history,” which results in a reinforcement 
that “every other planet is earth” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 68). Following this, 
we have the issue of the Earth as forgotten; that is, the Earth as the “ground 
of experience” which can be reclaimed through a careful phenomenological 
reduction. Intersubjectivity—or rather, intercorporeality—enters the scene by 
way of offering an access out of a “pre-Copernican world,” with the other 
assuming the appearance of an objective body who in turn experiences me in 
their fl esh also as an objective body. All of which is possible thanks to the fact 
that “my corporeality is communicable” (71). Thus, Merleau-Ponty retraces 
Husserl’s account of the fl ying bird, which at all times retains a primordial 
connection to the “true Boden” (72).
If Merleau-Ponty maintains an alliance to Husserl in this late thinking, then 
his motivation for doing so is not simply to interpret Husserl on his own terms. 
It is in the fi nal few pages of these lectures that Merleau-Ponty instigates a 
departure from Husserl in a section titled “ontological scope of this analysis” 
(73-76). Merleau-Ponty remarks at the outset of this section that a “new type of 
being is unconcealed” in the relation between Earth, body, and intercorporeality 
(73). This new type of being, which is evident in the very formation of the stars 
and the Earth as a ground, upon which my corporeality is implanted onto the 
“Homeland-Being,” exists only as an “idealization” of a “terrestrial relation to 
the ground” (73). The ground contains its own history, and a history that if it 
is able to be integrated into subjectivity, then it is only because such a relation 
takes place at the level of a “preobjective relation among humans and upon 
the preobjective relation of humans to the earth” (73). This carnal prehistory is 
resistant to any idealization that takes place in relation to the Earth, where the 
Earth is considered as a phenomenal entity: “This Earth is the arche. i.e., the 
reserve from which all life, all future, all history can issue” (74).
At stake here, then, is an attempt to move beyond—both prior and beneath—
Husserl’s constituting ego to a level of latency that accords a reality to the 
Earth resistant to corporeality despite—or because—of the constitutive role the 
Earth plays for the subject. At the conclusion of the lecture, Merleau-Ponty’s 
distance not only from Husserl but also from transcendental phenomenology 
more broadly becomes abundantly clear, as he writes: 
All of this, this philosophical dimension of the Umwelt…of the world and of the 
mind before their correlative idealizations—is really different from an idealism; 
it is the “constitutive” genesis which is fi rst and in relation to which idealities are 
constituted (75). 
This “constitutive genesis” marks an explicit turn from Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology to what will become Merleau-Ponty’s own 
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archaeological phenomenology concerning the prehistory of perception. If 
these two frameworks operate on different levels, then this does not entail they 
are diametrically opposed, and as Merleau-Ponty notes from early on, Husserl 
was already attuned to the notion of a “intentionnalité opérante” (operative 
intentionality) from the outset (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012, 440-441).8
Despite this linage, when Merleau-Ponty returns to the problem of a “world 
before man” at the end of the course notes on Husserl, then his tone has 
shifted from the earlier comments in the nature lectures. This time, he admits 
that “there is a paradox only if we fi rst realise {in itself?} the universe of 
idealizations” (76). Thanks to the fact that Husserl had “enclosed” himself 
“in the dimension of the ‘consciousness’ of the absolute Ego,” he retains a 
fi delity to the “realist-causal order and the idealist-constituting order” (76). At 
the expense of this view, what is overlooked is the project that Merleau-Ponty 
himself adopts—“turning both [orders] not into a physical world relative to 
the idealistic Sinngebung (giving meaning), but into two correlative aspects 
of Being” (76). 
It is precisely this search for a latent Being—and a search that renders the 
very distinction between transcendental idealism and naïve realism possible—
that leads Merleau-Ponty to develop an ontology of his own, which can no 
longer be classifi ed under the simple term “phenomenology.” Merleau-Ponty’s 
reading of Husserl radicalizes the latter by rendering the Earth a pre-object, 
which, having been transformed into an external object, is reclaimed, not 
through a reduction of the transcendental Ego, but through returning to the 
primal arche of the Earth itself.
If both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl are both concerned with the origin of 
the body as bound to the Earth, then there is nevertheless a radical difference 
in where each of these philosophers locates the primordial origin. For Husserl, 
the primordial ground remains in the constituting Ego, thus positioning himself 
in the tradition of transcendental phenomenology he sought to overcome. 
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, presents us with an account of the Earth that 
opposes this leaning toward idealism. He does this, not through accounting 
for the Earth as an insurmountable thing-in-itself, less even as a mass of 
materiality, of which the contingent outcome is human corporeality. Rather, 
the primal Being that Merleau-Ponty locates is one that will be developed 
elsewhere in the elemental ontology of the Visible and the Invisible¸ especially 
as it fi gures in his late philosophy of nature as revolving around themes of 
latency, verticality, and depth. 
Already, however, the germs of this primordial ontology are evident in 
the course notes on Husserl where he speaks of “two correlative aspects of 
Being,” and as such, it is impossible to consider terms such as “Earth” and 
“primordiality” without invoking the adjoining notion of “Nature” as an 
elemental structure that resists transcendental phenomenology (76). Indeed, the 
Being in question is interchangeable with what Merleau-Ponty terms “Nature,” 
insofar as it designates that which renders carnality possible at all without at 
the same time being isolated to a metaphysical world in its own terms. 
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Toward an Archaeological Phenomenology 
Already we see Merleau-Ponty breaking from Husserl in his attempt to 
move not only beyond transcendental idealism, but also beyond a model 
of phenomenology that retains the primacy of the consciousness-world 
distinction. In turn, this leads Merleau-Ponty to develop a sense of the Earth 
as a primordial source that is not reducible to the transcendental subject but 
nor is it a thing-in-itself transported to another realm. The Earth here, such as 
it is presented in a sketch like form, assumes a presence somewhere between 
these polarities, situated in the same shadowy realm where Merleau-Ponty 
himself is positioned in respect to Husserl—“the refl ections, shadows, levels 
and horizons between things” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 160). The task now is 
to develop this shadowy phenomenology by exploring how the Earth fragment 
plays a formative role in Merleau-Ponty’s archaeological phenomenology. 
My usage of “archaeology” here refers to an orientation in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy, which can be described as a study of the pre-theoretical or primitive 
layers that are constitutive of corporeal perception—and for this reason, render 
experience possible—yet at the same time remain irreducible to experience (cf. 
Merleau-Ponty 1964).9 Methodologically, what is at stake is the importance 
of conducting what Merleau-Ponty famously terms in the Phenomenology 
of Perception, a “phenomenology of phenomenology” precisely through 
addressing the limits of what can be thematized (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
382). The archaeological orientation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy means 
developing a method of inquiry that is alert to the “infrastructure” underpinning 
meaning and sense while at the same time remaining recognising the edges of 
descriptive inquiry. 
To be sure, while this archaeological phenomenology fi nds its clearest 
voice in Merleau-Ponty, the seeds of it were already germinating in Husserl, 
whose studies of geology was not only evident in his reference to “strata,” 
“stratifi cation,” “terrain, and subsoil,”10 but was also central to his philosophy 
more broadly, as Eugen Fink writes: “Husserl always regretted that the 
expression which truly captures the essence of philosophy had already been 
taken over by a positive science, that is, the expression ‘archaeology’” (cited in 
Merleau-Ponty 1992, 187). It is precisely in the thinking of Merleau-Ponty that 
Husserl’s incipient archaeology becomes realised in an analysis of the “hither 
side” of perception. 
In turn, this notion of archaeology can only be considered within the context 
of both Merleau-Ponty’s late turn to psychoanalysis and also his usage of 
wild or brute being as attempting to capture that which phenomenology itself 
cannot, namely: “That primordial being which is not yet the subject-being nor 
the object-being and which in every respect baffl es refl ection” (Merleau-Ponty 
1970, 65-66). That Nature cannot be apprehended directly means that it then 
becomes phrased in terms of a resistance to refl ection.11 Both implemented 
and implicated by brute being, the subject is at no point truly able to transcend 
the primordial ground or soil from which she is structured and constituted. 
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Entering onto the scene of the world, the subject’s appearance merely reinstates 
a prehistory that was there long before thought itself initiated the process of 
attempting to understand this genesis. Throughout, the world of brute existence 
perdures in time, silently. 
This move toward the unrefl ected and primordial is, of course, present 
from the inception of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of origins. Indeed, the arc 
of Merleau-Ponty’s thought shifts gradually from a primacy of consciousness 
to what will become in a sense the primacy of unconsciousness (cf. Merleau-
Ponty 1968, 253/200). Because of this, with each phase of deepening this work 
of origins, Merleau-Ponty moves to varying layers and levels of the body, until 
at the end, the primordial strata of wild being joins with the mute body—a 
body that in every sense articulates the “past which has never been present”—
that assumes an archaeological status in subjectivity, leading him to write of 
his philosophy as occupying a “process similar to that of an archaeologist” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 252/1964a, 5). 
It is no coincidence, then, that the late language of archaeology folds 
over into the language of psychoanalysis. Thus, in the “Preface to Hesnard’s 
L’Oeuvre de Freud,” Merleau-Ponty will speak of the unconscious in terms 
of an “archaic or primordial consciousness…that we have not integrated” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1993, 67). This failure to integrate the “intemporal” and the 
“indestructible,” as he writes of the unconscious element within us, does not 
simply mirror Merleau-Ponty’s archaeological phenomenology in terms of 
attending to the non-phenomenological or “brute” dimension of Nature, but 
rather converges to the point where psychoanalysis and archaeology become 
two sides of the same procedure, leading him to speak of a “consonance” 
between each method where both aim toward the “same latency” (71.Italics 
in original).12 
In light of this, it is no coincidence that archaeology is the middle ground for 
both phenomenology and psychoanalysis, not only in terms of methodology 
but also in respect of the analogy itself. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty’s 
treatment of this relation is telling given he speaks of phenomenology and 
Freudian psychoanalysis as sharing “our archaeology” (71). In each case, 
Merleau-Ponty is attempting to trace how an unrefl ected—or unconscious—
corporeality can grant access to brute being without collapsing that primal layer 
back into a consciousness-world distinction that marked the Phenomenology 
of Perception and its commitment to intentionality. 
For Merleau-Ponty, then, archaeology—and thus psychoanalysis—signifi es 
less the retention of the past by a personal subject, and more the hermeneutic act 
of interrogating an impersonal structure, which allows the past to be retained 
in the fi rst place. In this respect, the past here is not one to be considered as a 
lost horizon of experience, but instead co-existent in the verticality of time—
that is, a time that is contemporaneous with the past and present as being co-
constituted. 
The convergence of phenomenology and archeologically is especially 
evident in the important essay, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” where the 
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role of the Earth fragment continues to exert a hold on Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-
Ponty 1964b). And indeed, it is precisely in this essay that the connections 
between Earth, brute being, and archaeology (and therefore psychoanalysis) 
can be made.13 
Up to the very end, Merleau-Ponty is not entirely able to free himself of 
Husserl, but instead manages to fi nd in the master thinker the germs of an 
ontology that will become Merleau-Ponty’s own. In this rich essay, Merleau-
Ponty famously attempts to conceive of an “unthought-of-element” in the 
fi gure of Husserl at the “end of [his] life” (160).14 Doing so, Merleau-Ponty 
positions himself in relation to a “new turn in Husserl’s thought,” marked by a 
“primordial faith” that is able to “give us not a representation of the world but 
the world itself” (163). The term “faith,” of course, reappears more centrally in 
The Visible and the Invisible in terms of a “perceptual faith” (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 3). In that text, Merleau-Ponty uses the term in an indexical way to mark 
“what is before any position” (3). In each case, what is at stake is a world 
before thought, a sensible world delineated by its visibility and continuity, and 
apprehended by a faith irreducible to science (12). 
On the following pages, Merleau-Ponty thematizes this faith in a pre-world 
within the context of Husserl’s unfulfi lled gesturing toward the “pre-theoretical 
layer,” on which various idealizations, such as those that we have already 
seen in the Earth fragment, form (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 165). Once more 
Merleau-Ponty is faced the central epistemic problem of his philosophy: how 
to gain access to the unrefl ected ground of experience without re-inscribing 
that origin as theoretical abstraction? Hence the question emerges: “Does the 
descent into the realm of our ‘archaeology’ leave our tools intact?” (165). That 
Husserl remained within the confi nes of a transcendental phenomenology 
means that Merleau-Ponty must seize upon this question himself. To be sure, 
the question marks the culmination of his “break” from Husserl given that 
any methodology committed to transcendental phenomenology is unable to 
negotiate with the notion of a phenomenological archaeology, if we take such 
an archaeology as beginning before constitutive analysis. Here, Merleau-Ponty 
provides the evidence for this incipient archaeology in Husserl in the form of 
a “latent intentionality…more ancient than the intentionality of human acts” 
(165). The attempt to seal the abyss between consciousness and reality—an 
abyss that Husserl is never able to heal, despite the germs of a solution within 
his thought—leads Merleau-Ponty to circle the “interval” between Nature and 
mind. 
After a detour into the pre-constitutive grounds of intercorporeality, Merleau-
Ponty returns to the re-thinking of Husserl in an attempt frame “intentional 
analysis” as being concerned with both subjectivity and Nature (178). The dual 
intentionality, effectively orientated in both a horizontal and vertical pathway, 
leads to the principal problem of a phenomenology at the limits of its own inquiry, 
namely: “To understand its relationship to non-phenomenology” (178). As 
indicated, this aim crystalizes the very essence of what appears fi rst as Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of origins and then later his indirect or archaeological 
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phenomenology. With it, the task of accounting for the elemental layer of 
existence, both constitutive of sense while at the same time being resistant to 
sense, serves as the leitmotif of brute being, as he writes: 
What resists phenomenology within us—natural being, the “barbarous” source 
Schelling spoke of—cannot remain outside phenomenology and should have its 
place within it. The philosopher must bear his shadow, which is not simply the 
factual absence of future light (178).
This attempt to situate the non-phenomenological element within 
phenomenology itself will continue to occupy Merleau-Ponty up to his death. In 
the late essay on Husserl, it assumes an especially explicit presence in terms of 
preparing the groundwork for another phenomenology, a phenomenology that 
once again is already evident in Husserl in the form of “unveiling a back side 
of things that we have not constituted” rather than the earlier project of gaining 
“intellectual possession of the world” (180). As this earlier phenomenology 
comes to its own limit, the remains and remnants of another phenomenology 
come to the surface. There, Merleau-Ponty is able to trace “beings beneath our 
idealizations and objectifi cations which secretly nourish them and in which we 
have diffi culty recognising noema” (180). 
One such example of this secret world is the Earth. Indeed, it is precisely 
within this essay that Merleau-Ponty makes a fateful return to the Husserl 
fragment, describing the Earth as either the “‘soil’ or ‘stem’ of our thought as 
it is of our life” (180). The language of “soil” and “stem” explicitly bridges the 
interval between the Earth as both belonging to life (or Nature) and thought (or 
mind) concurrently. No longer simply the ground upon which the lived body 
is able to move and rest in the world, the Earth now becomes a duplicitous 
concept, as much “the matrix of our time as it is our space” (180).15 
This interweaving of Nature and thought, and time and space, leads us to a 
sense of the Earth as the exemplary fi gure of Merleau-Ponty’s archaeological 
phenomenology. It is both a spatial horizon of experience but also lodged in the 
verticality of a time before experience. This “proto-history” marks the alliance 
with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of brute being, in that Earth as an archaeological 
site reveals both manifest and latent content, both a style of appearing and dis-
appearing.16 Such a “wild-fl owering world,” discovered, as though by accident 
in Husserl, so Merleau-Ponty suggests, leads to a “rediscovery of that brute 
mind which, untamed by any culture, is asked to create culture anew” (181). 
This incipient dawn of a new ontology draws together Merleau-Ponty and 
Husserl in the same shadow, a shadow that is cast by Husserl but undoubtedly 
falls to Merleau-Ponty to expand. 
***
It is clear from this account that “The Philosopher and His Shadow” marks 
Merleau-Ponty’s move from an account of the Earth as co-constitutive with the 
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lived body to the pre-constitutive soil placed in the interval between Nature 
and mind. Understood in this context, we come to see why Merleau-Ponty 
would speak of a “psychoanalysis of nature,” as he would in The Visible 
and Invisible (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 267). Far from the inert background 
against which corporeal subjectivity is propelled into the world, the Earth 
beckons both a memorial and immemorial timescale, both a destructible and 
indestructible materiality, which at no point can be localised as a “correlate” 
to human experience alone, but instead marks an irrecoverable depth anterior 
to human experience. Such an archaeological thinking involves the framework 
of a psychoanalysis insofar as the concept of “latent intentionality” belongs 
to an anonymous life rather than the personal experience of life itself. At the 
intersection of Nature and mind, psychoanalysis locates a blind spot structuring 
consciousness without ever being wholly accessible to consciousness. This is 
possible thanks to the fact the Earth, considered as both an archaeological and 
phenomenological concept, retains the non-phenomenological dimension of 
Nature precisely within the fi eld of phenomenology. 
Dylan Trigg
dylan.trigg@ucd.ie 
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NOTES:
1 My thanks to the Irish Research Council for their support funding this research, which 
is herein gratefully acknowledged.
2 Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with the Earth fragment is evident even in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, where it makes an appearance in the chapter on time 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 453). Thanks to the research of Herman Van Breda, we know 
of the details of Merleau-Ponty’s early trips to the Husserl Archives in Leuven, where 
these unpublished Husserl materials would have been available to him (Merleau-Ponty 
1992). At the other end of timescale, the fi nal mention of the fragment can be found in 
the signifi cant working note form June 1st 1960 concerning “transcendental geology” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 258-259). The note is signifi cant given the role Merleau-Ponty 
accords to the Earth in establishing the material foundations of history (See also 
Steinbock’s incisive commentary on the note [Steinbock 2000, 90-111]). 
3 The question of where Husserl ends and where Merleau-Ponty, although a fascinating 
question, is one that we have to leave aside in this paper. Suffi ce to say that the problem 
was already on Merleau-Ponty’s mind during this period in his thinking, remarking in 
the key essay on Husserl that “there must be a middle-ground on which the philosopher 
we are speaking about and the philosopher who is speaking are present together, 
although it is no possible even in principle to decide at any given moment just what 
belongs to each” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 270). (See also Toadvine and Embree 2002).
4 On Schelling’s infl uence on Merleau-Ponty’s account of wild being see Vallier 2000.
5 On the semantic ambiguities of “Boden” as both ground and foundation concurrently 
see Steinbock 1995, 110.
6 This side-stepping of the fi rst point is not only for the sake of maintaining a thematic 
focus. It is also due in large to Husserl’s dismissal of his own response to the Earth’s 
relation to another Earth; namely, by rendering the Earth divisible. In this way, an 
“inner space” is created that gives rise to a series of earthly body parts. Husserl is not 
convinced, and goes so far as to question if “the diffi culty of the constitution of the 
earth as a body [is] hopelessly exaggerated?” (122). As it stands, the question is left 
unanswered and soon abandoned.
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7  To do justice to these questions, we would need not only a conceptual analysis of 
Earth as it fi gures in both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s thinking, but also an applied 
phenomenology of the body in a multiplicity of affective states. In this instance, to 
speak of the experience of the Earth as “groundless” would lead us—almost certainly 
via Heidegger’s account of “groundless fl oating”—toward the experience of anxiety 
(Heidegger 1996, 158). A study of this relation between Earth, ground, and anxiety is 
currently in preparation (cf. Trigg 2013).
8  My thanks to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for pointing this connection out.
9  For more on Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the term “archaeology” see especially Leonard 
Lawlor’s incisive discussion of the theme in chapter two of his Thinking Through 
French Philosophy: The Being of the Question (Lawlor 2003). Gary Brent Madison’s 
earlier treatment of the concept is also worthy of note (Madison 1990, 138-139). 
Merleau-Ponty’s own usage of archaeology can be found throughout his later works, 
especially “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” the course notes on nature, and the late 
lectures on Husserl (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 2003, 2002). Of special note is another 
of Merleau-Ponty’s late works concerning the relation between phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis, which I discuss below (Merleau-Ponty 1993). Finally, we must also 
mention the passing reference to archaeology written during this time in his “Five 
Notes on Claude Simon,” which are to be found in Texts and Dialogues (Merleau-
Ponty 1992). There, he will make the connection between an “Archaeology of thought” 
as also being “of the future as well” (142).
10 I owe this insight concerning Husserl’s geological background to Dermot Moran.
11 On the theme of “resistance” in Merleau-Ponty’s account of Nature, see Ted Toadvine 
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature (Toadvine 2009, 50).
12 For the reasons stated, I am included to agree with Lawlor’s tentative suggestion that 
Merleau-Ponty’s usage of archaeology may just as easily refer to Freudian analysis 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, xxxv).
13 On the importance of this essay in Merleau-Ponty’s overall relation to Husserl, see 
Ted Toadvine’s exemplary article, “Leaving Husserl’s Cave?” (Toadvine and Embree, 
2002, 71-94). Toadvine makes the argument in this chapter that in contending with a 
phenomenology at the limits, “an archaeology of its past” is involved, which requires 
less a dialogue with Descartes as the axiomatic fi gure in Husserlian phenomenology 
and more with Plato.
14 On Merleau-Ponty’s “unthought thought” (impensé), see Barbaras 2004, 69.
15 Here, we cannot help but note in relation to this passage Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
“transcendental geology” as involving “the very time that is space, this very space that 
is time” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 258).
16 For this reason, Lawlor is surely right to suggest that “this originary soil is the 
unconscious,” reinforcing here the link between archaeology and psychoanalysis as 
both concerned with “what resists phenomenology” precisely through being implicated 
by phenomenology (Lawlor 2003, 32).
